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Abstract 
This paper investigates the existence and determinants of interest rates dispersion in loans 
and deposits of Spanish banks. A unique feature of the research is that it covers a whole 
industry (thirty products and two hundred banks) from 1989 to 2003. We find that: i) interest 
rates dispersion is a persistent phenomena in loans and deposits markets; ii) the differences 
across products in the observed dispersion can be explained as a function of variables that 
affect the private net benefits of consumers’ investment in information including search costs 
(frequency and volume of transactions); iii) interest rate dispersion is more sensible to product 
specific inflation than to changes in the interest rate of the economy; iv) regulation of 
standards of transparency by the Spanish Central Bank has been effective in reducing interest 
rate dispersion. 
 
JEL: D83, G18 
Key words: price dispersion, search costs, information differentiation, inflation, transparency 
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1 Introduction 
When information is costly to produce markets may be affected by information differentiation, 
which in turn gives place to market power by selling firms in otherwise homogeneous 
products and perfectly competitive markets. This is the main contribution of Stigler’s (1961) 
and Rothschild’s (1973) path breaking papers in the economics of price formation in markets 
where buyers engage in costly search to locate more favorable trade opportunities.  
Information differentiation helps to explain the empirical regularity of price dispersion, the fact 
that consumers’ perfect substitute products sell at different prices in a persistent way. Indeed, 
a variety of models have formally shown that price dispersion can be an equilibrium solution in 
markets where information is not freely available. Other theoretical research has related costly 
search and information differentiation with the welfare loss attributed to price inflation. 
This paper studies the dispersion in monthly quoted annual interest rates by 
Spanish banks from 1988 to 2003. The study covers fifteen asset products and fifteen liability 
products offered by over 200 banks, practically the population of retail banks in Spain in the 
period of study. The research interests are to evaluate the magnitude of price dispersion in 
the retail banking industry and to find out if such dispersion varies across products in ways 
that are consistent with theoretical predictions from equilibrium search models that 
contemplate repeated purchases. Care is taken to evaluate price dispersion free from price 
differences across banks due to product differentiation as banks can differentiate their offers 
to make products less substitutes from the products of their competitors. Finally, the paper is 
policy oriented since it tests if public regulation of banks’ interest rate transparency by the 
Spanish Central Bank has been effective or not to reduce price dispersion, and it investigates 
if price dispersion is affected by the development and use of new technologies such as 
Internet. 
We find that interest rates dispersion exists in Spanish retail banking and the 
dispersion is persistent over time. The dynamics of interest rates changes over time are 
consistent with (randomized) pricing strategies by banks in order to make more difficult for the 
consumers to learn about which banks offer better conditions for their loans or deposits. 
Interest rate dispersion increases with product specific inflation, but much less with changes 
in the interbank interest rate. Dispersion is higher in loans and deposits of higher maturity and 
in loans and deposit with lower balances. Higher maturity and larger volume of balances are 
also associated with higher mark ups of interest rates over the interbank interest rate.  
Regulation by the Spanish Central Bank aimed to increase transparency has contributed to 
lower interest rate dispersion. Interest rates dispersion increases with the introduction of the 
Euro but there is evidence that the dispersion has decreased during the late years of the 
period coinciding with the diffusion of Internet banking. These findings are consistent with the 
hypothesis that interest rate formation in retail banking takes place under conditions of 
information differentiation due to consumers search costs. 
Empirical research in price dispersion is still very limited, especially if one compares it 
with the amount of research about other determinants of market power, such as collusion 
and product differentiation. A first distinct feature of our paper is that the empirical analysis 
is quite comprehensive since it covers a whole industry of a country for a long period of 
time. This contrasts with Sorensen (2000) who studies prescription drugs price dispersion in 
pharmacies of two towns in a given moment of time; with Dahlby and West (1986), who study 
the determinants of price dispersion in a regional market for one automobile insurance 
product during five years data; with Van Hoomissen (1988), who focuses mostly on the 
relation between inflation and price dispersion, and with Lach (2002) who focuses on the 
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pricing strategies of stores to sustain price dispersion but not in the explanation of observed 
price dispersion. Neither Sorensen nor Dahlby and West control for price inflation in their tests 
of the determinants of price dispersion and this may bias their results if inflation is correlated 
with some of the explanatory variables used in their analysis, for example the level of prices of 
drugs of different frequency of purchase. Van Hoomissen, on the other hand, does not model 
other product attributes different from product specific inflation and the model ignores the 
stock of information at the beginning of the period (i.e. lagged dispersion). Lach only reports 
pricing strategies that attempt to keep price dispersion over time, but does not model price 
dispersion itself. 
Second, banking products are a good laboratory to study price dispersion. Financial 
products offered by banks in the form of loans and deposits have different maturity, which 
implies different frequencies in the transactions between banks and consumers, higher for 
short term loans/deposits and lower for long term ones. The frequency of the transaction is 
one of the key variables identified in the literature to determine differences in search activity by 
consumers [Benabou (1993), Fishman and Rob (1995), Sorensen (2000)], so our database is 
particularly suitable to investigate price dispersion. Moreover, we can also test if the average 
volume of the transaction in each product affects dispersion given that higher volume implies 
higher benefits of search. 
Third, the time dimension of the data allows us to test some of the predictions about 
the transaction costs created by inflation and to evaluate whether pricing strategies by 
banks are consistent with the mixed strategies prescribed in the literature to assure the 
persistence of price dispersion over time [Diamond (1971), Varian (1980) and Lach (2002)]. 
The transaction costs of inflation originate price dispersion when there are costs of adjusting 
nominal prices (menu costs) as in Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) and Benabou (1992); by the 
fact that unanticipated inflation increases dispersion by reducing the information content of 
observed prices [Benabou and Gertner (1993)]; due to the increment in the depreciation rate 
on the stock of information [Van Hoomissen (1988)]; and because an increase in the rate of 
inflation raises the variance of producers costs [Fishman and Rob (1995)]. 
A distinct feature of the retail baking industry is that short-term marginal cost of loans 
and short-term marginal revenues from the deposits are closely tied to the interbank interest 
rate. The paper investigates if interbank interest rate inflation, common to all banks, is the 
relevant measure of inflation to explain price dispersion across banking products or, on the 
contrary, the monetary shock of changes in the interbank rate over time are not transmitted 
evenly across banks so that the inflation measure that distorts price formation is a product 
specific one. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model 
and the main hypothesis about the determinants of price dispersion and market power. 
Section 3 presents a description of the Spanish banking sector and of the loans and deposits 
used in the research as well as the data on interest rate available for the analysis. Section 4 
contains the results of the estimation of the empirical models. Finally, Section 5 discusses the 
results and summarizes the conclusions and main findings of the paper. 
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2 The basic theory 
The theoretical framework is based on the assumption that price formation in each of the 
products, banks’ loans and deposits, results from monopolistic competition among the banks 
operating in the market. Banks can have market power because of product differentiation and 
because of information differentiation in product markets that are segmented by the type of 
service, mainly loans and deposit. Since the price data refer to monthly interest rates on new 
transactions made during the respective month, it will be assumed that banks make 
decisions taking operating costs as a fixed cost. Under this assumption, prices of loans 
and deposits are determined by the bank applying a mark up to the money market interest 
rate r. We assume that most of the differences across banks in terms of costs and product 
differentiation are stable over time. There may also exist heterogeneity across buyers of 
banking services in terms of differences in search costs, believes about the price distribution 
or repetitiveness of purchases over time. 
From the profit maximizing solution of a bank that faces an inelastic demand function 
for loans or an inelastic supply function of deposits, the price charged by bank j for product i 
in month t will be equal to1, 
tijt rtjikp ⋅= ),,(  (1) 
where k(i,j,t) is the profit maximizing mark up as a function of characteristics of the bank, the 
product, the information and search activity of the consumers and the time period and rt is the 
interbank interest rate. A relevant distinction to be made is between loans and deposits. 
Banks charge interest rates for loans and pay interests to deposits. When there is an 
interbank market, interest rate rt is, at the same time, the marginal revenue that can be 
earned from the deposits, and the marginal cost (opportunity cost) of the money lent to a safe 
borrower. The mark up in loans will therefore be greater than one and the mark up in deposits 
will be less than one. 
The variable k(i,j,t) depends on the elasticity of demand, ED, for loans, and on the 
elasticity of supply, ES, for deposits, in the following way, where sub-index L means loans 








),,(  (2) 
Therefore market power, k(i,j,t) different from 1, comes from inelastic supply and 
demand functions for the products of the respective banks2. Product differentiation and/or 
information differentiation lower the effective substitution between banks in each of the 
product markets and make supply and demand for the products of each bank price inelastic. 
Interest rates differences across banks for product I in period t will be affected by 
product differentiation decisions of the banks and by information differentiation that will result 
from the limits in the incentives to search by the consumers. We shall focus on the later. In 
markets with homogeneous products, a bank will be able to pay a lower interest for the 
deposits if there is a positive probability that a depositor that approaches the bank has not 
been offered a higher interest for the same deposit in another bank, and the consumer 
                                                                          
1. For general models of the banking firm see Freixas and Rochet (1997). 
2. An interior profit maximizing solution in the loans market requires that the elasticity of demand be greater than 1 in 
absolute value at the profit maximizing interest rate, so that the mark up in this market is greater than 1 (interest in loans 
higher than interbank interest rate). 
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accepts the offer by the bank instead of incurring in the cost of searching for another offer. If 
search activity increases because search costs decrease or because the consumer has more 
benefits from the search, then price dispersion and price level are likely to decrease (the 
interest on deposits would, of course, increase with more search, although the predictions for 
price dispersion are the same as for the loan products). 
For a given search cost per unit of activity, the benefits and incentives to do more 
search activity will increase with the frequency of purchases [Benabou (1993) and Fishman 
and Rob (1995)]. The reason is that the benefits of finding a bank that charges lower interest 
for loans, for example, are realized each time a new loan is made and the total expected 
benefit of search will increase with the number of repeated purchases. Frequency of 
purchase, on the other hand, can also be regarded as “a measure of the number of times the 
information gained from a price search can be used before that information expires” 
[Sorensen (2000), page 836]. Since the search activity has a cost independent of the amount 
of the transaction but the total benefits of lowering interest rates on loans or of getting more 
interest from the deposits will increase with the amount of the loan or deposit, search activity 
should be higher in banking products with larger average volume per transaction. Therefore, 
other things equal, price dispersion will be lower for banking products with more frequent 
transactions over time and for products with higher volume per transaction. 
Besides cross section sources of price dispersion as those mentioned above, price 
dispersion is also affected by the evolution of the level of prices over time. The models that 
study these relationships are grouped into menu cost models, as Benabou (1992), signal 
extraction models, Benabou and Gertner (1993), and information investment models [Van 
Hoomissen (1988)]. In banking products menu costs can be expected to be very low but 
inflation (deflation) changes the distribution of interest rates from period to period and 
therefore when there is inflation, investing in information will have lower return for the 
consumer. Thus, for the same frequency of purchase, consumers will find optimal to be less 
informed when prices change at a higher rate. 
As Van Hoomissen (1988) indicates, consumers determine the optimal stock of 
information to hold about prices and places to shop as well as the optimal flow on new 
information (investment through search activities), as a function of the costs of search, of the 
equation that transforms search into valuable information, and the rate at which the stock of 
information depreciates. Since depreciation increases with inflation of the product, consumers 
will hold less information and therefore price dispersion will be higher when the rate of change 
in the level of prices is also higher. 
The cost and benefits of search and the returns from investing in information can 
change over time due to technological innovations, for example new distribution channels as 
Internet, due to new commercial policies by banks, for example the use of advertisement 
on prices to attract consumers, or due to new regulatory rules about transparency on prices 
and other product attributes. An across the board reduction in search costs because sellers 
advertise the prices of the products and consumers can easily observe and compare them 
when doing their shopping, will lower price dispersion and the level of prices. For a similar 
reason, a change in regulation in interest rate transparency that forces banks to publicize the 
terms of their loans of deposits, or forces them to use standardized prices (such as the 
annual equivalent rate of interest of the loan or deposit) for loans and deposits, will lower 
dispersion for a given search activity of the consumers. Therefore we expect that regulatory 
reforms that increase interest rates transparency will lower interest rates dispersion in loans 
and deposits. 
But there are other circumstances in which the costs of search vary across buyers 
and then the predictions about the effect in price dispersion of technologies that close the 
gap in search costs, are less straightforward. In these cases the final effect on price 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 13 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0506 
dispersion of the diffusion of price search technologies, such as Internet, becomes an 
empirical question3. 
A distinctive feature of banking markets is the existence of an interbank market 
where banks can borrow and lend at a given interest rate. The interbank interest rate 
becomes the short-term marginal cost of lending for a bank, assuming no risk premium, and 
the marginal revenue from the deposits. The interbank interest rate and its variations over time 
is public information that consumers of banking products can know at negligible costs. One 
relevant question to be asked is whether interbank inflation is or is not a sufficient statistic for 
product specific inflation in all the bank products or, to the contrary, banks choose 
randomized strategies in deciding the interest rates of their products which lowers the link 
between interbank interest inflation and product specific inflation. In this respect Varian (1980) 
argues that, in order to assure persistent price dispersion, firms will use mixed strategies to fix 
prices, otherwise buyers could learn the true distribution of prices after repeated search and 
dispersion could not be sustained. 
Each bank offers multiple products, loans and deposits, but little is known about the 
theoretical and empirical implications for price dispersion of the existence of multi product 
firms. McAfee (1995) gives conditions under which multi product equilibrium price dispersion 
satisfies the property that “the marginal distribution of any one good’s price is the same as if it 
were determined in a single good environment” (page 93). We will assume that this property 
holds in our price data. But the characteristics of the market can still vary across products. 
For example, relationship lending [Boot (2000)] may make the demand of loans from a 
particular bank fairly price inelastic, while mortgages are likely to be more standardized 
products and each bank faces a price elastic demand for this product. Reinganum (1979) 
provides conditions under which price dispersion will be lower in markets with more elastic 
demand and, according to them, price dispersion should be lower in more standardized 
products such as mortgages, than in less standardized ones such consumers’ and business’ 
loans. 
                                                                          
3. Stahl (1989) presents a model of competition with search costs in which some of the consumers in the market pay a 
search cost for each price offer they get, and others have no search costs. In the equilibrium solution, an increase in the 
proportion of consumers with zero search costs first increases the dispersion in prices and later reduces it, if the initial 
proportion of informed consumers is rather low. Brown and Goolsbee (2002) test the predictions of Stahl in the life 
insurance industry assuming that the proportion of consumers with zero search costs corresponds to buyers that use 
Internet as a searching device. 
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3 The Spanish banking sector, definition of the variables and preliminary 
evidence on interest rate dispersion 
3.1 Developments in the Spanish banking sector and regulation on transparency 
The Spanish banking industry was heavily regulated at the beginning of the seventies. 
From 1974 onwards, restrictions on price (interest rates and fees), quantities (compulsory 
investment coefficients) and capacity (geographical expansion through new branches) were 
progressively lifted. The deregulation process was long, with some steps backwards from 
time to time, but eventually it led to a banking system where institutions could set freely the 
interest rate of all of their banking products as well as open branches nationwide4. For the 
purpose of the present paper we shall focus on the changes in the Spanish banking sector 
that may have more consequences for information differentiation and dispersion in interest 
rates: liberalization of interest rates, transparency regulation and competitive behavior by 
banks. 
Liberalization of interest rates has occurred through a lengthy period. During the 
period under study, 1988 to 2003, banks have been free to set interest rates on loans and 
deposits. In 1989 the ban for savings banks opening branches outside their regions of origin 
was removed and since then new competitors have entered local and regional markets. This 
has occurred at the same time that intense merger activity has reduced substantially the 
number of banks. The third quarter of 1989 a large nationwide bank started a very aggressive 
advertising campaign in order to attract depositors for sight accounts.  The level and nature of 
competition has been also affected by the development of the money and investment funds 
market, mainly after tax changes in 1991, and by the fact that Spain joined the Euro area so 
that, since 1999, interbank interest rates have been at historical low values, with real rates 
close to zero or even negative. Technological advances have allowed the development of 
other channels to reach customers. In particular, since the year 2000 some very active 
telephone and Internet banks have put in place aggressive price strategies to gain market 
share in deposits markets. 
Apart from the liberalization measures, Banco de España, the banking regulator and 
supervisor, put a lot of attention and detailed requirements for banking transparency and 
consumer protection, in particular, regarding interest rates. After the complete liberalization of 
interest rates in 1987, Banco de España increased transparency requirements regarding 
interest rates. Banco de España Rule 15/1987 explained how interest rates had to be 
calculated (i.e. in terms of yield rate) in order to make comparisons of rates across banks 
homogeneous. Rule 11/1988 and Rule 15/1988 provided even more detailed guidance in 
order to calculate the yield rate and, the latter one enhanced the obligation to publish quite 
visibly and permanently information on some interest rates (i.e. those of loans to prime 
customers and overdrafts) as well as advising to provide information on some other loan 
rates. Apart from that, Banco de España started to collect information from every bank about 
interest rates for several types of products with various maturity breakdowns5, both from the 
asset and the liability side. 
Rule 8/1990 increased significantly information to customers and transparency. In 
every bank branch it was made compulsory to have a clearly visible permanent panel in order 
to keep customers informed of interest rates applied by the bank (extending the previous 
coverage to other loans and deposits) as well as other information (to mention that there is a 
                                                                          
4. A thorough analysis of the Spanish banking deregulation process, chronology and its consequences in terms of 
efficiency and solvency can be seen in Salas and Saurina (2003). 
5. This database is the one we use in the paper. See below for a thorough discussion of its content. 
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booklet offering more information on product characteristics, tariffs, valuation procedures, 
etc., as well as the Laws that protect banking customer interests). 
Finally, Rule 5/1994 defined the official reference rates for mortgages at variable 
interest rates. In order to improve transparency and consumer protection Banco de España 
provides, since that rule, public information on several interest rate references that should be 
used preferably for banks in their mortgages at variable rates (i.e. mortgage interest rates are 
set as the reference plus some basis points). Those references, in particular, one of them 
based on Euribor (or Mibor before European Monetary Union) have become the benchmark 
for the mortgages market and more than 90% of all new mortgages granted at variable rates 
(the bulk of mortgage operations in Spain) are based on them. 
As the liberalization process advanced, the Banco de España has enhanced banking 
transparency and information release by making compulsory to disclose some interest rate in 
each bank branch, providing references and detailed instructions in order to make interest 
rates comparable and creating and supporting rate benchmarks and, finally, by publishing 
some of those interest rates. One of the interest of the paper is to find out if banking 
regulation has indeed contributed to reduce search costs among bank customers through 
improved comparability and transparency6. 
3.2 Sample of banks and banking products 
As mentioned before, Banco de España Rule 15/1988 started to ask for detailed 
information on interest rates set by banks (i.e. commercial and savings banks) in all their new 
operations. It is very important to realize that the information is based on new operations 
undertaken (i.e. new loans granted or new deposits received) instead of being information on 
average interest rates, some of them set years ago. The interest rate reported by the bank for 
a given product is the weighted average of the interest rate charged in the operations made in 
that product during the corresponding month. Thus, we have information on marginal interest 
rates for around 200 banks during 172 months and 30 different banking products. 
For each bank, information is available on the annual interest rates quoted 
monthly to several loan products: discounting of receivables, credit line facilities, 
uncollateralized personal loans, mortgages and loans at variable interest rates. Except for 
mortgages in which almost all of the loans are long term (maturity of three years or more), 
the rest of the loans are broken down in periods of different maturity: up till 3 months, 
between 3 months and 1 year, between 1 and 3 years and more than 3 years. On the 
liability side, banks declare interest rates paid on current accounts (sight deposits that 
include check facilities), savings accounts7 (sight deposits that do not incorporate any check 
facility), term deposits, repo-type deposits (i.e. a deposit backed by the bank with a 
government security) and, finally, other deposits (i.e. zero-coupon-type products), with a 
five maturity break down: up till 3 months, from 3 to 6 months, from 6 to 12 months, from 1 
to 2 years and more than 2 years. 
The information requirement covers both commercial and savings banks. Therefore, 
we almost have the whole population of Spanish banks8. We have set a minimum market 
share (in national terms) of 1 over 10,000 in terms of total assets, in order to eliminate inactive 
banks that introduce a lot of noise in the data (i.e. many blanks in the data) but allowing us to 
include very small local banks that, although not being important players at national level, they 
have a more relevant role on some province markets. Moreover, mostly all the branches of 
                                                                          
6. Nakane and Koyama (2003) find preliminary evidence of the role played by dissemination of information on interest 
rates by Banco do Brazil in order to decrease their dispersion. 
7. Current and savings accounts with no remuneration, or with very close to zero remuneration, are excluded.  
8. We do not have information on interest rates posted by credit cooperatives which, in any case, represent less than 
the 5% of total deposits. 
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foreign banks have been excluded (but not subsidiaries of foreign banks) in order to 
concentrate the analysis on retail markets (in both loans and deposits)9. 
Apart form that, given the existence of missing values (as a result of no new 
operations in the month) we performed further filtering of the data base. In particular, for each 
product and bank, we only have taken into account data from years in which there is 
information of interest rates for at least eight months, so as to get rid of banks that have few 
or no operations in a given product during a year. 
For each product and maturity, up to a total of thirty different banking products, a 
dummy variable is defined. RECEIVABLE, takes the value of 1 if it is a receivables operation 
and zero otherwise; the variable is further broken down in three maturity periods, less 
than 3 months, between 3 and 12 months and more than 12 months (up to 3 years). 
CREDITLINE, takes the value of 1 if the loan is  a credit line and zero otherwise; the maturity 
here goes as follows: less than 3 months, from 3 months to 1 year, from 1 to 3 years and 
more than 3 years. PERSONAL, takes the value of 1 if it is a personal loan and 0 otherwise; 
the same maturity breakdown as CREDITLINE. MORTGAGE, 1 if it is a mortgage loan with a 
more than 3 year maturity (given the characteristics of this product, used mainly by 
households to finance the acquisition of their houses, it is clearly a long term product, being 
the amounts lend to shorter periods almost negligible) and 0 otherwise. VARIABLE takes the 
value of 1 if the loan has a variable interest rate and 0 otherwise; variable interest rates are 
revised in one, three or more than three months10. 
Regarding liability-side products, CURRENT takes 1 if it is a sight current account 
with check facilities, 0 otherwise. SAVINGS take 1 if it is a sight account without check 
facilities and 0 otherwise. For the purpose of the paper it is assumed that the relevant 
transaction is to open or close a current or saving account, not the frequency with which the 
balance of the account is used to make payments or withdraw cash. The time interval 
between opening and closure is, in general, large and therefore current and saving accounts 
are considered products of low frequency of transaction (i.e. they are included among the 
products of long maturity). DEPOSITS takes the value of 1 if the product is a term deposit 
and 0 otherwise; the maturity breakdown is less than 3 moths, between 3 and 6 months, 
between 6 months and 1 year, between 1 and 2 years and more than 2 years. CTA will be 
equal to 1 if it is a “repo” operation and 0 otherwise, with maturity of less than 3 months, 
between 3 and 6 months, between 6 months and 1 year and between 1 and 2 years. 
Finally, DISCLIABILITY takes 1 if the product is a zero-coupon type emission by the bank 
and 0 otherwise; maturity breakdown is the same as CTA. 
For the purpose of the paper it is important to identify the potential incentives for 
price search by consumers, borrowers and depositors, in each of the selected products. As 
indicated in the former Section, these incentives will depend, on a given moment of time, on 
the frequency and amount of the transactions so that, more frequency and higher volume will 
imply more search activity and less price dispersion. The general assumption is that short 
maturity implies higher frequency of the transaction and therefore the empirical prediction is 
that a positive association is expected between maturity and price dispersion within 
each product and in the overall. To facilitate comparisons, bank products will be grouped 
into three categories, LOW, MEDIUM and HIGH maturity depending upon their respective 
maturity class. The variable LOW will take the value of 1 for all products that have 
maturity of less than 3 months and 0 otherwise; MEDIUM will take the value of 1 for products 
on the liability side with maturity between 3 months and 2 years, and for loan products 
                                                                          
9. Branches of foreign banks have also a very small market share, in particular in deposits, mortgages and loans 
to SMEs, the bulk of banking activities in Spain. However, a foreign branch that has been the last years a very active 
player in the Spanish deposit market through Internet and telephone banking has been included. 
10. It is important to recall that variable interest rate mortgages are excluded from this group of loans because they are 
included in MORTGAGE. 
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between 3 months and 3 years, and 0 otherwise; HIGH takes the value of 1 for products with 
maturity above 2 (deposits) and 3 years (loans), and 0 otherwise. 
Products are grouped into large or small volume of transaction taking into account 
regulatory experience and partial information available on average balances for each 
of them11. The variable LARGE will take the value of 1 for the products CREDIT LINE, 
MORTGAGE, VARIABLEmore3months, DEPOSITS, CTA and DISCLIABILITY, and 0 otherwise. The 
variable SMALL takes the value of 1 for the rest of the product categories and 0 otherwise. 
The grouping of banking products according to maturity and volume of the transaction is 
summarized in Table 1. 
The structural changes in the Spanish banking sector will be incorporated to the 
empirical model through time dummy variables. Since those rules and developments 
are permanent, we construct dummy variables equal to 0 until the month the 
change happens and equal to 1 from that month onwards. Therefore, REG90 is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 from October 1990 onwards and 0 otherwise 
(i.e. Rule 8/1990 came into effect on October 1990). Note that REG90 takes 1 for almost all 
the period studied and, therefore, is close to a general constant term. Changes made by 
Rule 5/1994 came into effect in August 1994 and, given that they focused on mortgages, 
REG94 takes the value of 1 for mortgages from August 1994 till the end of the period 
and 0 otherwise. We test the possible “Euro” effect in price dispersion through the 
explanatory variable EURO, a dummy variable that takes 1 since January 1999 and 0 before. 
Finally, to account for the possible effect of Internet banking in search activity and price 
dispersion we define the variable TECH that takes the value of 1 for each month after 
January 2000 and 0 otherwise. The variable is introduced into the model allowing for different 
effects in the loan and in the deposit products (DEPOSITSTECH takes the value of 1 if the 
time period is beyond January 2000 and the bank product is a deposit product, 
and 0 otherwise). 
3.3 Measures of price dispersion and inflation 
Observed prices of banking services can differ across banks due to product differentiation 
and due to information differentiation. If banks fix their interest rates according to a formula 
like (1) then a measure of price dispersion such as the standard deviation of prices across 
banks for product i in t will be equal to the standard deviation of mark up times the interbank 
rate rt. If rt increases or decreases over time we would observe changes in price dispersion 
over time even if the dispersion of mark ups (i.e. differentiation) remains unchanged. To avoid 
this undesirable effect, price dispersion will be evaluated from the log of the respective 
interest rate, 
tijtijt rkp lnlnln +=  (3) 
Both, the product and the information differentiation will still affect the dispersion in 
the log of the price across banks. The former can be associated to policies and management 
practices put in place by each bank to make more attractive its products to the consumer 
(convenient branches, friendly attendants, better general consumer service, persuasive 
advertising, corporate image and so on) and, therefore, they will be bank specific and 
relatively stable over time. If our interest were price dispersion due to information 
differentiation, it would be necessary to obtain measures of price dispersion free of possible 
effects of product differentiation. As in Van Hoomissen (1988), this paper will examine the 
time behavior of interest rate dispersion by looking at the dispersion of interest rates 
                                                                          
11.  The average size of sight deposits is around 5,000 euros whereas that of term deposits is five times larger. Average 
size of credit lines is between ten and twenty times larger than other loan type products to firms (i.e. receivables). 
Mortgages are around 100,000 euros. 
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movements over time. The assumption is that price dispersion due to information 
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The interbank relative interest rate variability for product i in month t is the standard deviation 
of banks interest rates movements around the average relative change in the interest rate of 










=  (4) 
As indicated in Section 2, one of the possible sources of price dispersion is inflation. 
Our analysis considers product specific inflation and general inflation. The former is measured 
by the absolute value of Dit and the later by the absolute value of the rate of change in the 
interbank interest rate DIBt = ln (rt/rt-1). 
Table 2 contains a summary of the variables used in the analysis and their respective 
definitions, while Table 3 contains a summary of the descriptive statistics for the dependent 
dispersion variable, Vit, and for the product specific inflation variables Dit in absolute terms. 
3.4 Preliminary evidence on interest rate dispersion 
Table 4 presents information about the evolution in the level of interest rates on loans and 
deposits in Spain in four periods of time between 1988 and 2003, together with the evolution 
of the interbank interest rate also in the same periods. In 1988-1991 the interbank interest 
rate was 14.07%, in average during the period, and goes down to 3.83% during 2000-2003. 
The average interest rates across banks and products follow a similar pattern both in the 
assets (from 16.8% to 6.43%) and in the liabilities side (from 9.64% to 3.15%). 
The table confirms that there is dispersion in interest rates across banks and the 
dispersion differs across products. For example in the period 2000-2003 the average 
standard deviation of interest rates across banks for the 15 loan products is 1.54, with a 
maximum of 3.71 and a minimum of 0.47. For deposits the standard deviation is lower, 0.63, 
with a range between 0.96 and 0.25. The average dispersion remains rather stable over time 
for loans and decreases for deposits, but the coefficient of variation, standard deviation of 
interest rates across banks divided by average interest rate also across banks, in average for 
the loans and for the deposits products, does not decrease over time for either type of 
products. 
The comparison of the numbers in Table 4 is affected by differences in mark up 
across banks, by changes in the mark up over time and by the evolution of the interbank 
interest rate over time. Table 5, on the other hand, presents similar evidence but now the 
variable is not the interest rate but the mark up, pijt/rt, for loans and rt/pijt for deposits, so that 
the two mark ups can be directly comparable. The average mark up for the thirty products 
and for all the banks goes from 1.47 in 1988-1991, to 1.70 in the period 2000-2003. The 
average mark up has increased over time especially for loan products (from 1.2 to 1.71), 
while it remains rather stable for deposits (from 1.74 to 1.68). The average mark up tends to 
increase with maturity of the products and decrease with the volume of the transaction. 
The dispersion in mark up is positive and persistent over time, as the values of the 
standard deviation of the mark up across banks indicate. In the period 1988-1991 the 
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average for all thirty products of this standard deviation is 0.283 and in 2000-2003 goes up 
to 0,624. The average standard deviation is different loans and deposits but their respective 
average coefficients of variation tend to converge over time. Overall, the pattern of standard 
deviations across maturity and volume follows the pattern of average mark up (dispersion 
increases with maturity and decreases with volume), which would be preliminary evidence 
consistent with the theory that links price dispersion with search activities and information 
differentiation. 
3.5 Pricing Strategies 
The persistence over time of price dispersion in homogeneous products can only occur if 
sellers follow mixed strategies to fix prices [Varian (1980) and Lach (2002)]. Otherwise, if some 
sellers always sell at the highest price and others at the lowest one, buyers would finally learn 
who the low price-selling firms are and they would only buy from them. Thus, to confirm that 
banks do indeed follow some randomizing process to fix interest rates is prior to further 
analysis of the determinants of dispersion. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of all banks in the sample according to their 
respective frequency of being classified as banks that for product i and month t have the 
highest, the middle or the lowest change in their interest rate (for a maximum of 30 products 
times 171 months). The pure randomized pricing strategy would imply that the area of the 
three regions of Figure 1 is equal. With few exceptions, most often banks tend to be classified 
a similar number of times in each category so, again, the preliminary evidence is in favor of 
pricing behavior that tends to take advantage of search costs and information differentiation 
of the consumers. 
The second prediction from the use of mixed strategies by sellers is that the position 
of the bank in the ranking of interest rate changes in a given time period, will vary over time. 
To confirm this prediction Table 6 shows the mean, the maximum and the minimum of the 
standard deviation of the positions in the rankings of interest rate variations of the 20 largest 
banks of the sample during all the months considered in the analysis. The standard deviations 
are relatively high for all banks, evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that banks 
randomize their interest rate decisions12. 
                                                                          
12. If ranks were randomly distributed, according to their uniform distribution, they should have a standard deviation of 
12
1nt )( − , where nt is the number of entities taken into account in month t. If n = 20 then the random dispersion would 
be 5.48. 
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4 Empirical models of price dispersion 
From the theoretical hypothesis and the definition of the variables presented above, the 











+++++= ∑−  (5) 
The lagged dependent variable is included as explanatory variable to account for 
possible persistence effects in the evolution of dispersion. From the investment information 
model the lagged dispersion will also be a proxy of the stock of information at the beginning 
of the period. Product specific inflation Dit is included in linear and squared form to account 
for non-linear effects of inflation on price dispersion. Inflation is measured in absolute values 
since the theoretical models (signal extraction and investment in information) predict that the 
effects on dispersion are symmetric in inflation and deflation periods. The time trend variable T 
is an additional control variable that will capture possible trends in the dispersion variable over 
time. 
The results from the estimation of the model are presented in Table 7. The first 
column corresponds to the estimation of the model with time dummy variables in substitution 
of the regulatory, technological change and euro dummy variables. The second column 
includes the later variables and excludes the time dummies. The estimated coefficients of the 
explanatory variables lagged dispersion, product specific inflation and bank products 
dummies are very similar in the two estimations. The two R2 are also very close. Therefore, 
the REG, EURO, TECH, DEPOSITTECH and T variables capture rather well the time dynamics 
of the dispersion variable after controlling for the persistence, inflation and product dummy 
variables. Overall, the results obtained show that dispersion of interest rates across banks has 
persistent effects, the coefficient of Vit-1 is statistically significant, and it increases with the rate 
of product specific inflation, since the coefficients of Dit and Dit2 are both positive, but only the 
former is statistically significant13. 
The coefficients of REG90 and REG94 are both negative and statistically significant, 
which indicates that the transparency regulations, in general, REG90, and specific for 
mortgages, REG94, contributed to lower price dispersion. The introduction of the Euro 
increases the interest rates dispersion across banks, the coefficient of EURO is positive and 
statistically significant, while the new distribution and price search technologies with Internet 
seem to decrease interest rate dispersion more intensively in the deposits products 
(coefficients of TECH and DEPOSITECH negative and significant). Finally, the time trend has a 
positive and significant coefficient a result that points towards an increase in interest rate 
dispersion over time, even after controlling for all the rest of the variables of the model. 
The estimated values of the coefficients of the product dummies βi give the average 
dispersion for each product after we control for the rest of the variables of the model. The 
highest estimated coefficient is 5.39 for RECEIVABLE 1 to 3 years and the lowest 1.125 for 
RECEIVABLE less than 3 months. For this loan product dispersion increases with maturity but 
this is not the case for CREDITLINE and for PERSONAL which are also the products with 
higher and more even dispersion across maturities. The coefficient of MORTGAGE, on the 
other hand, is the lowest among products of long maturity, a result that can be explained by 
                                                                          
13. We re-estimated the model taking into account the hypothesis of i) potential endogeneity and ii) autocorrelation in 
the error term The results obtained were almost equal to the ones obtained with OLS. To test the hypothesis of 
i) endogeneity, we have used instrumental variables (lags of Dit). ii) On the other hand, we have performed tests of 
autocorrelation: Only 6 out of the 30 time series were likely to present autocorrelation. Then, we have estimated a model 
with a specific coefficient for the lagged dependent variable for each of those products. As a result, the errors did not 
show any significant autocorrelation. 
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the fact that this is a standard product (high price elasticity of demand) with high volume per 
transaction. 
To test for statistical differences among the price dispersion of products of different 
maturity and different volume per transaction, the thirty products are classified in low 
medium and high maturity and in large and small volumes per transaction. Sub-index i 
(of product type) is first decomposed in two, q and m, where q refers to one of the ten 
product categories and m takes three values one for each maturity, LOW, MEDIUM and 
HIGH, as defined above. The basic model (column 2 of Table 7) is estimated again with the 
additional constraint that all products within each class of maturity have the same coefficient, 
ω1m= ω2m=…=ωqm=… =ω10m = ωm , for m =  LOW, MEDIUM and HIGH (6) 
The exercise is repeated grouping the products according to the volume per 
transaction in LARGE and SMALL, also defined above. The restriction imposed in the model 
is now, 
φ1v = φ2v =…= φqv =…= φ10v = φv , for  v= LARGE and SMALL (7) 
The estimated coefficients ωn and φv are presented in the first column of Table 8 
expressed in their long-term values. The results confirm that price dispersion increases with 
maturity of the banking products and is also higher for products with low volume per 
transaction than for products with high volume per transaction. LOW maturity products (less 
than 3 months) have in average 5.76 percentage points (pp) of dispersion in their rates 
of change of interests over time, almost 1 pp less than products with MEDIUM maturity 
(between 3 months and 2/3 years), with average dispersion of 6.73%. Finally, HIGH maturity 
products (more than 2/3 years) have on average a 8.64% almost 2 pp more dispersion than 
products of MEDIUM maturity. All these differences are statistically significant at the 1% level 
of significance or less as indicated by the values of 0 for the p statistics in the corresponding 
column of the table. Moreover, the null hypothesis that ω1 = ω2 = ω3, that is, all products of 
different maturity have the same average dispersion, is rejected also at p values close to 
zero14. 
Finally, the groups of products with LARGE volume per transaction show 1.2 
percentage points less dispersion than the SMALL volume ones, a difference also statistically 
significant at p values close to zero15. 
The coefficients in the OLS estimation of equation (5) presented in Table 8 are 
obtained under the restriction that the model is the same across products except for the 
product dummy variables that vary depending upon maturity and volume. A robustness test 
of the previous results compares the average dispersion across maturity and amount of the 
transaction allowing for differences in the coefficients of the variables Vit, Dit and Dit2 for each 
product and maturity. To do so, equation (5) is estimated under a SUR specification, where 
the coefficients of the explanatory variables, lagged dispersion and product specific inflation, 
are allowed to be different for each product and maturity. The model is estimated twice, once 
with restriction (6) and the other with restriction (7). The values of the estimated coefficients of 
variable ωn and ωv are presented in the second block of columns of Table 8. The estimated 
coefficients follow the same pattern and show similar values than those obtained under OLS 
and common lagged persistence and inflation effects. 
                                                                          
14. F (2,5063) = 139,15,  p value equal to 0. 
15. The result of the test φLARGE = φSMALL gives an statistic F(1, 5063) = 102,5 so the null hypothesis is again clearly 
rejected. 
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4.1 Price dispersion and mark up 
The evidence of price dispersion points towards information differentiation in the banking 
markets. This differentiation is one of the potential sources of market power for the firms in 
the market. Therefore, one important corollary from the results above is that the same 
sources of differences in the costs and benefits of consumers search across products that 
determine more or less price dispersion, will also determine differences in their respective 
mark up. The dependent variable is now ln(pit/rt) = ln(kit) for the case of loans and 
ln(rt/pit) = - ln(kit) for the case of deposits, where pit is the average interest across banks of the 
product i in period t. The explanatory variables are the same as in equation (5) but substituting 
lagged average mark up in the place of lagged dispersion. 
The hypothesis are that the coefficients of the variable PRODUCTi will vary across 
maturity and volume in the same way as the coefficients of the same variables do when the 
dependent variable is Vit, price dispersion. In other words, high maturity (low frequency of 
transaction) and low volume that imply, both, more information differentiation, will be 
associated with higher mark up. Second, we also expect the same signs as in Table 7 for the 
coefficients of the regulatory, euro, technology and time trend dummy variable. The model is 
estimated under the same variations that were used to obtain the values of the coefficients in 
the first part of Table 8 referred to price dispersion; that is, with restrictions defined in 
equations (6) and (7), and two specifications, OLS and SUR estimations. 
The second part of Table 8 presents a summary of the results from the estimations. 
The mark up increases with maturity and is lower for products that involve large transactions 
than for those of small transactions. The differences in the estimated coefficients are 
statistically significant at 1% levels or less except in the case of the difference between low 
and medium maturity. The coefficients of the rest of the variables have in most of the cases 
the same sign and similar levels of statistical significance than the coefficients presented in 
Table 7, which reinforces the robustness of the results obtained using dispersion as 
dependent variable16. 
The search models predict that price dispersion and profit margins will move 
together in response to changes in the parameters that describe the search environment. The 
same could be expected for our measure of mark up and the rate of change in interest rates: 
if the distribution of changes in the interest rates of the banking products are affected by 
consumer search, a positive correlation could be expected between the residuals of the 
regression of dispersion and the residuals of the regression on mark ups. The reason is that 
the effects of unobserved characteristics of the products and of the banks that may shift the 
costs of search but have not been taken into account in the regression, should have the 
same sign. 
Computing the simple correlation between the residuals of the two models we obtain 
a value of 0.07, statistically different from 0 at the 1% level. Since this correlation is affected 
by the time variation of the variables of the model, we regress the residuals of the basic model 
of dispersion and the residuals of the mark up model controlling form time dummies. The 
estimated regression coefficient between the two variables is 0.06, statistically significant 
at the 1% level, and the correlation coefficient of the regression is 0.28. Therefore the null 
hypothesis that the residuals of the two regressions are independent is clearly rejected. 
Overall, the behavior of the mark up confirms the conclusions obtained from the 
basic model of price dispersion and we can conclude that the empirical evidence on interest 
                                                                          
16. The estimated model for the common variables, in the SUR estimation, is as follows, with coefficients in long term 
values: 
 ln(kit)=-0,09REG90 – 0,05REG94 + 0,06 EURO + 0,03TECH – 0,27 DEPOSITTECH + 0,001T 
           (-3,6)             (-1.4)              (1,8)              (0,5)             (-4,2)                           (6,0)   
t values in brackets. 
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rate formation in loan and deposit products is affected by factors that create conditions for 
information differentiation due to search costs by borrowers and depositors. 
4.2 General and product-specific inflation 
The interbank interest rate is a common benchmark for the interest rates of all the banking 
products. This section will present evidence on whether changes in the interbank rate over 
time are sufficient statistics for the rate of inflation of each of the products considered in the 
analysis or, alternatively, the most relevant measure of inflation is still product specific. To do 
so, an additional variable, the absolute value of the change in the interbank interest rate in 
month t with respect to t-1 (DIBit) is  introduced into de model of dispersion [equation (5)]. 
Table 9 presents the results. The first estimation includes both general and product 
specific inflation as explanatory variables while the second introduces only general inflation. 
The estimated coefficient of the variable DIBit is negative and has lower absolute value than 
the corresponding coefficient for the variable of product specific inflation. The negative sign of 
the common inflation variable suggests that dispersion may be affected by relative inflation of 
product i with respect to interbank interest rate inflation. When the product specific inflation 
variables are excluded from the regression, the coefficient of the common inflation variable is 
significant with a positive sign but the coefficient of the variable is very low and the goodness 
of fit of the model is reduced. Common inflation has a positive effect in price dispersion, but it 
is not a sufficient statistics for the evaluation of the effect of inflation in the dispersion of 
interest rates. Interbank interest rate can help consumers to predict the evolution of interest 
rates of particular banks in a limited way so, banks seem to be effective in maintaining 
persistent price dispersion over time. 
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5 Discussion and conclusion 
This paper presents empirical evidence in favour of the hypothesis that information 
differentiation is an important variable to explain price formation in the markets of financial 
products supplied by banks, both in the asset side (loans) and in the liability side (deposits). 
The evidence is obtained taking care to isolate information differentiation from product 
differentiation due to bank specific variables that are relatively stable over time (consumer 
service, convenience, credit risk policies, ownership, etc). The paper also provides preliminary 
evidence that the significant decline in the interest rates over time across banks during the 
period 1988-2003 may be highly determined by the evolution of the interbank interest rate, 
while the competitive conditions show no trend at all. Neither the observed evolution in mark 
up nor the positive trend in interest rate dispersion suggest that competition has significantly 
increased in banking markets during the period of study. 
According to the results of the paper, information differentiation is observed in the 
form of persistent dispersion across banks in the interest rates of each one of the thirty 
financial products considered in the analysis. Such differentiation is also observed in the 
distribution of average mark up across products, that follows a similar pattern as price 
dispersion. Evidence is also provided consistent with the prediction that in order to sustain 
price dispersion over time, banks will randomize their pricing strategies so making difficult for 
the buyers to find banks that offer systematically worst or systematically better conditions. 
Secondly, price dispersion and average mark up vary across products in a 
consistent way with the predictions from the theory of search according to which one way 
consumers have to obtain information about product prices is to search for products of lower 
price, taking into account that search is costly and therefore the amount of search will be 
endogenously determined from the marginal benefits and costs of search. The paper confirms 
this result by the fact that the financial products which show less persistent dispersion and 
lower average mark up are also those with lower maturity (more frequency of shopping) and 
higher volume of balances, precisely the variables that the literature associates with higher 
benefits of search. 
Third, product specific inflation increases price dispersion in a significant 
and proportional way. One percentage point increase in inflation increases dispersion 
in 0.25 percentage points in the short term and 0.40 percentage points in the long term, 
according to Table 7. This result provides support to the theories that relate price dispersion 
and inflation, as higher inflation means higher depreciation of the existing stock of information 
hold by the consumers in the market. They also confirm that inflation can produce important 
frictions and inefficiencies in the functioning of markets and that lower volatility in the market 
interest rate can produce additional benefits to those of lower level interest rates, in terms of 
more efficient markets of financial products supplied by banks. 
Our forth important result is that past regulatory initiatives aimed at increasing 
transparency in interest rates in order to reduce search costs, seem to have been effective in 
reaching that objective. This would confirm that private incentives of banks and consumers to 
produce information might result in a stock of information about ranking and distribution of 
interest rates, inferior to the socially optimal stock. Since the level of persistent price 
dispersion is still relatively high, the results of the paper recommend further regulatory 
initiatives in this direction. The introduction of new technologies that allow for new distribution 
channels for the banking products and especially for lower search costs, seem to contribute 
to lower interest rate dispersion and, therefore, they may be a source of more competition in 
these markets. However, the effect of Internet in reducing dispersion in interest rates differs 
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across products being more effective in deposit products, presumably more homogeneous, 
than in loan products. 
The results of the paper point out that the markets of financial products supplied by 
banks are far from being homogeneous. Moreover, common inflation across products 
measured in terms of absolute variation in the interbank interest rate is clearly insufficient to 
capture the effect of inflation in price dispersion across products. To properly explain such 
dispersion the relevant variable is inflation specific to each loan or deposit product, which 
points out to segmentation and heterogeneous competitive conditions across banking 
products even though interbank interest rate sets a parallel time trend evolution for most of 
them. 
The evolution of mark ups and dispersion of relative prices over time differs across 
products, even after taking into account the effects from possible sources of information 
differentiation. Although these conclusions would require further and more thorough analysis, 
it appears that current and saving accounts may not be quite sensitive to interest rates since 
they are the deposits products that show the highest level of price dispersion. Consumers 
may search before deciding in which bank to open the accounts, satisfy liquidity needs and, 
maybe, obtain better interest but, after the choice of a bank is made, search stops. Second, 
the loans’ markets appear highly segmented in mortgage loans, personal loans and business 
credit. Interest rate dispersion in mortgages is lower than in the rest of the loans. The 
differences may be attributed, at least partly, to the effects of relational lending and the 
benefits of investing in information about the attributes and behaviour of the borrowers by the 
lenders to overcome problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Some form of price 
dispersion in credit markets may result from investments in information by the banks that 
encourage long term relations and reduce credit rationing. If this was the case, interest rates 
dispersion in bank loans markets may respond to particular features that are not present in 
other products and markets. 
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LOW MATURITY MEDIUM MATURITY HIGH MATURITY LOW MATURITY MEDIUM MATURITY HIGH MATURITY
RECEIVABLEless3months RECEIVABLE3months-1year PERSONALmore3years CREDITLINEless3months CREDITLINE3months-1year CREDITLINEmore3years
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VARIABLEless1month PERSONAL3months-1year SAVING DISCLIABILITYless3months VARIABLEmore3months DEPOSITSmore2years










TABLE 1.-Grouping of products by Maturity and Volume.
LARGE VOLUME
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Variable
PRODUCTi Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
for product i and 0 otherwise.
 
Vit Price dispersion of product i  in month t . Standard  deviation  across  banks ( j  )  of 
ln  (pijt /pijt-1), where pijt is the annual interest
rate applied by bank j  in product i  for period t.
Dit Inflation rate of product i in month t. Absolute value of average  values  of ln(pijt /pijt-1) 
across banks ( j ).
DIBt Inflation rate of the interbank interest rate Average  absolute  value  of ln(rt /rt-1); where r  is 
in month t. the monthly interbank interest rate.
REG 90 Regulatory variable that accounts for obli- Takes the value of 1 from 10/1990 (when the re-
gation of bank to publish interest rates in gulation is issued) to 03/2003 and 0 otherwise.
the branches.
REG 94 Regulatory   variable  that  accounts for the Takes the value of 1 from 08/1994 onwards if the
impact of  publication  of reference interest product i is a mortgage and 0 otherwise.
rates for mortgages at variable rates.
EURO Dummy   variable  that  accounts for the Takes the value of 1 from 01/1999 onwards and
impact of  the introduction of the Euro. 0 otherwise.
 
TECH Variable that  captures the development of Takes the value of 1 from 01/2000 onwards and 
Internet as a distribution channel. 0 otherwise.
DEPOSITTECH Variable  that captures a possible different Takes the value of 1 from 01/2000 onwards if the
effect of Internet as distribution channel for product i is a liability for the bank.
deposit products.
LOW Variable  that identifies products with It takes the value of 1 when the product has
short maturity (up to 3 months). a maturity up to 3 months and 0 otherwise.
 
MEDIUM Variable that identifies products with me- It takes the value of 1 when the product has
 dium maturity (from 3 months to 2 and 3 years a maturity greater than 3 months and smaller 
 in liability and asset products, respectively. than 2/3 years and 0 otherwise.
HIGH Variable that identifies products with high It takes the value of 1 when the product has
 maturity (more than 2 years in asset products a maturity greater than 2/3 years and 0 otherwise.
3 years in liability products).  
SMALL Variable that identifies products with It takes the value of 1 when the product has
low volume per transaction. a low volume and zero otherwise.
LARGE Variable that identifies products with It takes the value of 1 when the product has
large volume per transaction. a large volume and zero otherwise.
Definition




































Product Mean Std.Deviation Min Max Mean Std.Deviation Min Max
RECEIVABLEless3months 5.294 1.840 2.362 15.412 1.416 1.151 0.015 4.683 19010
RECEIVABLE3months-1year 5.486 1.742 2.857 18.418 1.416 1.182 0.006 6.196 18310
RECEIVABLE1year-3years 16.213 4.668 7.238 34.160 2.127 1.923 0.001 9.185 13126
CREDITLINEless3months 15.935 6.579 5.750 40.140 2.322 1.860 0.053 8.516 11982
CREDITLINE3months-1year 12.613 4.500 5.125 24.592 1.950 1.525 0.015 7.216 17389
CREDITLINE1year-3years 9.947 2.988 4.368 16.694 1.746 1.421 0.002 7.372 18832
CREDITLINEmore3years 14.033 6.289 5.862 63.393 2.057 1.773 0.016 9.547 9888
PERSONALless3months 15.477 5.208 6.346 30.635 2.110 1.822 0.055 9.673 16280
PERSONAL3months-1year 14.191 4.500 6.546 28.558 1.833 1.424 0.053 10.032 18844
PERSONAL1year-3years 10.841 4.135 4.438 21.101 1.833 1.404 0.009 7.053 19050
PERSONALmore3years 9.135 2.322 4.224 15.528 1.940 1.586 0.023 8.547 18616
MORTGAGEmore3years 5.349 1.547 1.893 11.079 1.657 1.205 0.028 6.511 17654
VARIABLEless1month 7.180 3.851 1.282 19.919 2.577 2.306 0.009 11.679 8805
VARIABLE1month-3months 7.354 3.291 2.060 16.642 2.349 1.974 0.013 10.127 12001
VARIABLEmore3months 7.778 2.382 3.141 14.360 1.865 1.525 0.003 8.821 16291
CURRENT 15.101 5.750 7.417 37.192 2.115 1.892 0.052 11.122 21611
SAVINGS 14.899 7.079 3.762 49.245 2.004 2.021 0.007 14.815 18118
DEPOSITSless3months 6.584 2.725 2.427 13.604 2.222 2.229 0.001 10.416 14907
DEPOSITS3months-6months 7.692 3.436 3.295 19.653 2.291 2.261 0.001 10.716 18740
DEPOSITS6months-1year 7.703 3.201 2.598 17.844 2.321 2.131 0.020 10.111 18836
DEPOSITS1year-2years 8.785 5.678 3.502 50.564 2.535 2.351 0.021 11.532 18481
DEPOSITSmore2years 13.615 5.273 5.335 33.282 2.640 2.441 0.007 12.437 13750
DISCLIABILITYless3months 5.911 3.060 1.035 14.855 2.536 2.380 0.003 12.275 2886
DISCLIABILITY3months-6months 5.874 2.788 1.452 18.753 2.438 2.397 0.002 10.824 3160
DISCLIABILITY6months-1year 7.449 3.648 2.220 20.324 2.880 2.719 0.004 13.667 3063
DISCLIABILITY1year-2years 6.982 3.091 1.399 16.882 3.120 2.528 0.067 13.012 3271
CTAless3months 6.457 4.157 1.673 19.344 2.918 3.047 0.031 21.158 18487
CTA3months-6months 11.291 5.536 3.593 27.159 3.032 2.432 0.053 12.247 16368
CTA6months-1year 11.888 5.942 3.276 27.793 3.227 2.668 0.006 16.083 14811
CTA1year-2years 10.636 5.863 1.498 33.631 3.143 2.854 0.004 14.895 5522
Vit     (in percentage) Dit    (in percentage)
































   
Banks average Standard Deviation Coeff. of Variation Banks average Standard Deviation Coeff. of Variation Banks average Standard Deviation Coeff. of Variation Banks average Standard Deviation Coeff. of Variation
Interbank interest rate 14.07   10.51   5.05   3.83   
Loan products
Products´ average 16.80 1.70 0.10 13.94 1.89 0.13 7.83 1.85 0.23 6.43 1.54 0.23
Maximum 19.90 2.77 0.16 16.88 3.70 0.25 9.66 3.77 0.42 8.19 3.71 0.47
Minimum 15.40 0.86 0.06 11.67 0.93 0.08 6.13 0.61 0.09 4.99 0.47 0.09
Average Short Term 16.17 1.60 0.10 13.22 2.01 0.15 7.44 2.31 0.31 6.21 1.77 0.29
Average Medium Term 17.40 1.77 0.10 14.63 1.98 0.14 8.24 1.80 0.22 6.64 1.51 0.23
Average Long Term 16.46 1.71 0.10 13.52 1.48 0.11 7.50 1.17 0.16 6.34 1.20 0.19
Average Low Volume 17.20 1.81 0.11 14.36 2.06 0.14 8.13 2.05 0.25 6.62 1.67 0.25
Average High Volume 16.20 1.54 0.09 13.30 1.64 0.12 7.38 1.54 0.21 6.16 1.34 0.22
Deposit products
Products´ average 9.64 1.58 0.19 8.52 1.04 0.14 4.08 0.63 0.18 3.15 0.63 0.24
Maximum 11.43 2.66 0.61 9.94 1.98 0.52 4.89 1.12 0.60 3.73 0.96 0.86
Minimum 3.82 0.71 0.06 3.80 0.74 0.08 1.87 0.33 0.07 1.12 0.25 0.07
Average Short Term 11.17 1.66 0.15 9.36 0.87 0.09 4.47 0.51 0.11 3.38 0.51 0.15
Average Medium Term 9.99 1.44 0.14 9.04 0.89 0.10 4.30 0.54 0.13 3.39 0.59 0.17
Average Long Term 7.09 1.89 0.27 6.14 1.66 0.27 3.03 1.01 0.33 2.20 0.86 0.39
Average Low Volume 6.05 2.11 0.35 5.10 1.80 0.35 2.38 1.03 0.43 1.55 0.91 0.58
Average High Volume 10.19 1.49 0.15 9.05 0.93 0.10 4.34 0.57 0.13 3.39 0.59 0.17
Number of observations 106291 125436 115956 80406
TABLE 4.- Evolution over time of average and dispersion of interest rates across banks for loan and deposit products.(%).


































Banks average Standard Deviation Coeff. of Variation Banks average Standard Deviation Coeff. of Variation Banks average Standard Deviation Coeff. of Variation Banks average Standard Deviation Coeff. of Variation
Products´ average 1.468 0.283 0.158 1.367 0.253 0.162 1.548 0.419 0.237 1.698 0.624 0.290
Maximum 4.972 2.302 0.463 3.590 1.833 0.511 4.203 2.798 0.666 7.394 6.697 0.906
Minimum 1.095 0.062 0.056 1.062 0.094 0.083 1.044 0.100 0.094 1.031 0.077 0.075
Average Loans 1.197 0.122 0.100 1.356 0.194 0.140 1.640 0.414 0.250 1.713 0.420 0.233
Average Deposits 1.739 0.444 0.216 1.378 0.312 0.183 1.456 0.423 0.223 1.683 0.828 0.347
Average Short Term 1.212 0.178 0.147 1.225 0.176 0.144 1.408 0.400 0.284 1.482 0.431 0.291
Average Medium Term 1.403 0.221 0.158 1.287 0.193 0.150 1.438 0.291 0.202 1.445 0.371 0.257
Average Long Term 1.983 0.587 0.296 1.770 0.516 0.291 2.027 0.784 0.387 2.661 1.557 0.585
Average Low Volume 1.621 0.363 0.224 1.631 0.387 0.237 1.953 0.694 0.355 2.325 1.074 0.462
Average High Volume 1.380 0.236 0.171 1.214 0.175 0.144 1.313 0.259 0.197 1.335 0.363 0.272
Number of observations
 
106291 125436 115956 80406
TABLE 5- Evolution over time of average and dispersion of mark up across banks for loan and deposit products.
Time Period 2000-2003Time Period 1988-1991 Time Period 1992-1995 Time Period 1996-1999
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1 51 101 151 201
Banks
Low change Medium change High change
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Mean Maximum Minimum Number observations
RECEIVABLEless3months 4.326 5.803 3.339 2625
RECEIVABLE3months-1year 4.379 6.191 2.788 2634
RECEIVABLE1year-3years 4.003 4.944 2.580 2453
CREDITLINEless3months 3.280 4.461 2.342 2026
CREDITLINE3months-1year 3.835 4.776 2.539 2379
CREDITLINE1year-3years 4.212 5.837 3.448 2590
CREDITLINEmore3years 3.720 4.674 2.049 2010
PERSONALless3months 3.757 4.484 1.629 2288
PERSONAL3months-1year 4.536 5.722 3.664 2722
PERSONAL1year-3years 4.479 5.378 3.096 2806
PERSONALmore3years 4.444 5.849 2.916 2818
MORTGAGEmore3years 4.433 5.283 2.806 2721
VARIABLEless1month 2.648 3.286 2.151 1785
VARIABLE1month-3months 3.230 3.821 2.094 2028
VARIABLEmore3months 4.326 5.631 3.177 2720
CURRENT 4.471 6.436 3.291 2806
SAVING 3.573 4.593 1.303 2636
DEPOSITSless3months 3.511 4.131 1.812 2183
DEPOSITS3months-6months 4.312 5.815 0.669 2781
DEPOSITS6months-1year 4.534 5.798 3.441 2794
DEPOSITS1year-2years 4.627 5.651 3.794 2806
DEPOSITSmore2years 4.157 6.185 0.793 2698
DISCLIABILITYless3months 1.537 2.065 1.112 2183
DISCLIABILITY3months-6months 1.520 1.931 0.934 947
DISCLIABILITY6months-1year 1.551 1.941 0.934 802
DISCLIABILITY1year-2years 2.227 3.084 1.569 966
CTAless3months 4.721 6.101 3.713 2806
CTA3months-6months 4.484 5.350 2.493 2709
CTA6months-1year 4.328 5.442 2.875 2672
CTA1year-2years 2.857 4.749 1.357 1283
TABLE 6.- Standard deviation of banks. (%).
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COEFFICIENT STAND. ERROR COEFFICIENT STAND. ERROR
Vit-1 0.608*** (0.011) 0.595*** (0.035)
Dit 0.291*** (0.050) 0.249*** (0.063)
Dit
2 0.007 (0.005) 0.012 (0.008)
RECEIVABLEless3months 1.172** (0.561) 1.125*** (0.189)
RECEIVABLE3months-1year 1.245*** (0.561) 1.201*** (0.186)
RECEIVABLE1year-3years 5.285*** (0.583) 5.390*** (0.529)
CREDITLINEless3months 5.127*** (0.582) 5.232*** (0.530)
CREDITLINE3months-1year 3.933*** (0.573) 3.993*** (0.396)
CREDITLINE1year-3years 2.903*** (0.568) 2.924*** (0.306)
CREDITLINEmore3years 4.437*** (0.577) 4.514*** (0.434)
PERSONALless3months 4.977*** (0.581) 5.074*** (0.510)
PERSONAL3months-1year 4.572*** (0.577) 4.654*** (0.461)
PERSONAL1year-3years 3.257*** (0.569) 3.293*** (0.342)
PERSONALmore3years 2.520*** (0.566) 2.532*** (0.282)
MORTGAGEmore3years 1.112** (0.562) 2.153*** (0.287)
VARIABLEless1month 1.554*** (0.564) 1.530*** (0.257)
VARIABLE1month-3months 1.702*** (0.564) 1.687*** (0.238)
VARIABLEmore3months 2.024*** (0.564) 2.016*** (0.241)
CURRENT 2.930*** (0.569) 3.163*** (0.367)
SAVINGS 4.037*** (0.575) 4.304*** (0.557)
DEPOSITSless3months 1.415** (0.562) 1.588*** (0.241)
DEPOSITS3months-6months 1.820*** (0.564) 2.008*** (0.280)
DEPOSITS6months-1year 1.181*** (0.564) 2.006*** (0.275)
DEPOSITS1year-2years 2.188*** (0.566) 2.392*** (0.378)
DEPOSITSmore2years 4.055*** (0.576) 4.325*** (0.496)
DISCLIABILITYless3months 1.053** (0.562) 1.215*** (0.267)
DISCLIABILITY3months-6months 1.035** (0.562) 1.196*** (0.261)
DISCLIABILITY6months-1year 1.535*** (0.564) 1.713*** (0.312)
DISCLIABILITY1year-2years 1.272** (0.564) 1.451*** (0.293)
CTAless3months 1.070** (0.563) 1.222*** (0.288)
CTA3months-6months 2.909*** (0.571) 3.151*** (0.412)
CTA6months-1year 3.125*** (0.572) 3.369*** (0.435)









Note: OLS regression with Huber-White robust estimates of standard errors.
Time-Dummy Variables Especification has been estimated with monthly time dummies.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
(*)=Significant at 10%     (**)= Significant at 5%    (***)=Significant at 1%.
Time-Dummy Variables 
TABLE 7: Estimates of the empirical model.






































Coefficients(1) p values(2) Coefficients(1) p values(2) Coefficients(1) p values(2) Coefficients(1) p values(2)
MATURITY
LOW  (ω1) 5.763*** 0.000 6.116*** 0.004 0.160*** 0.331 0.207*** 0.150
MEDIUM  (ω2) 6.730*** - 7.122*** - 0.190*** - 0.235*** -
HIGH  (ω3) 8.637*** 0.000 8.682*** 0.000 0.453*** 0.000 0.421*** 0.000
VOLUME
SMALL (ν1) 7.694*** 0.000 8.219*** 0.000 0.422*** 0.000 0.378*** 0.000
LARGE (ν2) 6.452*** - 6.626*** - 0.126*** - 0.205*** -
Number observations
(1) Coefficients significantly different from zero at 10% (*), 5%(**), 1%(***).
(2)  P values: Significant level at which the null hypothesis ω1=ω2, ω2=ω3, ν1=ν2.
Note: OLS regression with Huber-White robust estimates of standard errors and Seemingly Unrelated Regressions estimations.
Explanatory variables in all especifications: Lagged-dependent variable, Dit, D
2
it and regulatory variables.
The coefficients  have been calculated in their long term value:  
 
5100 5130
TABLE 8: Estimations with Maturity and Volume Variables
OLS estimation SUR estimationOLS estimation SUR estimation 
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COEFFICIENT STAND. ERROR COEFFICIENT STAND. ERROR
Vit-1 0.594*** (0.035) 0.619*** (0.036)
Dit 0.384*** (0.037)
DIBit -0.040*** (0.014) 0.033*** (0.012)
RECEIVABLEless3months 1.103*** (0.188) 0.971*** (0.194)
RECEIVABLE3months-1year 1.180*** (0.185) 1.042*** (0.192)
RECEIVABLE1year-3years 5.348*** (0.533) 5.210*** (0.557)
CREDITLINEless3months 5.172*** (0.534) 5.113*** (0.557)
CREDITLINE3months-1year 3.943*** (0.399) 3.832*** (0.415)
CREDITLINE1year-3years 2.886*** (0.308) 2.761*** (0.320)
CREDITLINEmore3years 4.467*** (0.434) 4.360*** (0.449)
PERSONALless3months 5.027*** (0.513) 4.901*** (0.536)
PERSONAL3months-1year 4.613*** (0.464) 4.411*** (0.484)
PERSONAL1year-3years 3.248*** (0.345) 3.131*** (0.356)
PERSONALmore3years 2.481*** (0.284) 2.452*** (0.296)
MORTGAGEmore3years 2.133*** (0.289) 2.100*** (0.296)
VARIABLEless1month 1.465*** (0.259) 1.731*** (0.263)
VARIABLE1month-3months 1.620*** (0.239) 1.788*** (0.245)
VARIABLEmore3months 1.969*** (0.242) 1.940*** (0.251)
CURRENT 3.113*** (0.369) 3.101*** (0.388)
SAVINGS 4.273*** (0.559) 4.145*** (0.584)
DEPOSITSless3months 1.542*** (0.243) 1.672*** (0.250)
DEPOSITS3months-6months 1.960*** (0.284) 2.090*** (0.294)
DEPOSITS6months-1year 1.949*** (0.278) 2.087*** (0.288)
DEPOSITS1year-2years 2.334*** (0.377) 2.526*** (0.395)
DEPOSITSmore2years 4.269*** (0.500) 4.385*** (0.521)
DISCLIABILITYless3months 1.154*** (0.268) 1.424*** (0.281)
DISCLIABILITY3months-6month 1.143*** (0.263) 1.374*** (0.265)
DISCLIABILITY6months-1year 1.654*** (0.317) 2.015*** (0.332)
DISCLIABILITY1year-2years 1.365*** (0.298) 1.828*** (0.309)
CTAless3months 1.184*** (0.285) 1.584*** (0.288)
CTA3months-6months 3.069*** (0.417) 3.388*** (0.430)
CTA6months-1year 3.293*** (0.442) 3.665*** (0.458)
CTA1year-2years 2.773*** (0.456) 3.151*** (0.472)
REG90 -0.447*** (0.169) -0.414** (0.176)
REG94 -1.806*** (0.291) -1.819*** (0.291)
EURO 0.903*** (0.258) 1.067*** (0.259)
TECH -0.459* (0.246) -0.744*** (0.245)
DEPOSITTECH -0.897*** (0.222) -0.832*** (0.229)
TREND 0.010*** (0.002) 0.013*** (0.002)
R2
Number Observations
Note: OLS regression with Huber-White robust estimates of standard errors.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
(*)=Significant at 10%     (**)= Significant at 5%    (***)=Significant at 1%.
5100 5100
TABLE 9: Product and interbank interest rate inflation.
Dependent Variable: Vit  (in percentage)
Product and interbank inflation Interbank inflation
0.933 0.929
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